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by Havi Carel
University of Bristol
When I recently asked my 7-year-old son if he 
wanted to talk to a friend online, he replied angrily: 
“No! What’s the point if I can’t touch him!?” His 
exasperation expresses a basic aspect of human social 
life: it is embodied. Talking to someone online is a poor 
replacement for embodied engagement with others. 
When we are with other people we hug and huddle, 
we look into each other’s face as we share a joke, we 
walk together, eat together, cuddle on the sofa as 
we share a film or talk. For children, this embodied 
dimension of social exchange is even more dominant: 
when children play together, they spend much time 
hugging, huddling and giggling close together, chasing, 
touching, and making faces at each other. My son saw 
no point in socialising with a disembodied face on a 
screen when what he wants is the real deal: a flesh and 
skin interaction, involving touch and smell as well as 
sight and sound.
Moving to online socialising is one way in which our 
embodied existence has been modified by the pandemic 
and ensuing physical distancing measures. There have 
been profound changes to our freedom of movement, 
sense of time, and the sense of trust and certainty 
in the world. In this essay I analyse the bodily and 
personal changes brought about by the pandemic and 
resulting lockdown, and their profound disruption to 
life as we previously knew it. The essay has three aims. 
First, to make explicit the different aspects of lockdown 
experience and what I call the locked-down body. 
Second, to account for how our embodied lives have 
changed with the pandemic. And third, to reflect on 
our pre-pandemic habits and ways of life, which were 
previously taken for granted and hence hidden. To do 
this, I will contrast “normal” pre-pandemic social and 
embodied life with the “abnormal” or “new normal” of 
physical distancing and lockdown conditions.
The method I use is a phenomenological one: this is a 
philosophical approach focusing on how things appear 
to us (rather than how they “really” are). This approach 
studies human experience as embedded within a social 
and physical environment, or “world”, the total of 
which can be called, following Martin Heidegger, “being 
in the world” [In-der-Welt-sein]. This embeddedness 
in the social world and in our surroundings has been 
profoundly disrupted with the Covid-19 pandemic. As a 
result, an approach that focuses on that embeddedness 
as central to our life, and understands the human being 
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as a complex network of relations with others and with 
its environment, is useful for studying these profound 
and pervasive changes to our being in the world.
***
The first thing the physical distancing measures have 
made explicit is how deeply embodied and inherently 
social life is. The embodied dimension of many things 
we have previously taken for granted – how we move 
around in the world, hug loved ones, socialise freely, 
travel – is now clearly visible. We can use the contrast 
between life before and after Covid-19 for philosophical 
reflection on this unnoticed freedom we had and 
is now lost. This unnoticed freedom is a feature of 
normal situations, where one can just go ahead and do 
what one has planned, without hindrance or anxiety. 
Abnormal, or pathological, situations are ones where 
this is no longer possible. In the pandemic we have 
moved abruptly from a normal to an abnormal state, 
not just in one place or country, but across the entire 
world, from the Tropics to Antarctica. 
THE FIRST THING THE 
PHYSICAL DISTANCING 
MEASURES HAVE MADE 
EXPLICIT IS HOW DEEPLY 
EMBODIED AND INHERENTLY 
SOCIAL LIFE IS
This abrupt and dramatic transition vividly juxtaposes 
the normal, taken for granted, routine, familiar state 
of affairs (pre-pandemic life) and the abnormal, 
uncanny, destabilising and unfamiliar state we are in 
now. Of course, everyone’s life includes destabilising 
events and abnormal situations, such as suffering 
illness, being involved in an accident, and of course 
for many of the world’s people, there are experiences 
of displacement, war and famine, natural disasters, 
and political turmoil. This is important: I am by no 
means minimising or trivialising other experiences of 
disruption. But in this pandemic everyone’s lives have 
been upturned and deeply disrupted (albeit to varying 
degrees) across the globe. The closure of schools and 
workplaces, stay at home or shelter in place orders, and 
the shutting down of public spaces and amenities, as 
well as huge parts of cultural life (live music, theatre, 
sports) have caused disruption on a scale not known to 
most of those currently alive. Rather than disruptive 
experience being nested within a broader context of 
normal experience, we have definitively shifted into 
a new global regime of abnormality, underpinned by 
emergency measures used by almost every government 
in the world. The effects of the pandemic have been 
global both in its reach and in its global disruption to 
individual life: every aspect of life has been affected by 
the pandemic.
This gives us an opportunity to look at this contrast 
and glean philosophical insights from it. The first is 
that abnormal or “pathological” states can shed light 
on ordinary (“normal”) states, in ways that reveal and 
make explicit processes, ideas, and modes of behaviour 
that normally remain tacit. Pathological states can, 
uniquely, do additional epistemic work by revealing, 
and thus making available for investigation, tacit 
structures of expectations, meaning, and intelligibility 
that are largely invisible under normal conditions. 
Lockdown and the pandemic contrast with how things 
were previously and reveal the fragility and limitations 
of normalcy. If previously navigating the public world 
involved many pleasurable experiences such as eating 
out, taking one’s children to the playground, visiting a 
library or leisurely browsing in a shop, these are now 
all either forbidden or considered dangerous. How we 
come together in play parks and public spaces, how we 
greet each other on the street, and how we conceive 
of our personal space have all been thrown into sharp 
relief and underscored with anxiety. 
Our bodies have become a site of concern: many people 
now check their temperature daily and every cough or 
sneeze triggers alarm. A sneeze that would previously 
elicit a casual “bless you” now causes heads to turn 
in alarm. We interpret our own interoceptive states 
in a hyper-vigilant manner. Who hasn’t experienced 
a heightened sensitivity to the state of their throat? 
Suspected loss of one’s sense of smell or taste is 
imagined, considered and anxiously analysed. We now 
look back in wonder at how tens of thousands of people 
squeezed together for a football match, a festival or 
a music concert, how hundreds of people shared the 
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been considered pathological a few months ago. 
We avoid others, wash our hands compulsively, and 
engage in anxious rumination. This is now called “the 
new normal”, demonstrating that our conception of 
what counts as normal has shifted markedly. Tracking 
and understanding such changes to our normative 
assessment of what is normal and what is not, is deeply 
philosophically informative; it reveals the otherwise-
occluded complexity and adaptability of our moral and 
epistemic presuppositions.
For example, we are now discovering the limits of 
current medical knowledge – not enough is yet known 
about Covid-19 and we must adjust our epistemic 
standards to ones of high levels of uncertainty. Many 
questions do not currently have an answer, not even 
to the principled question “will there ever be a vaccine 
for Covid-19?” Similarly, moral presuppositions have 
been called into doubt when coping with difficult new 
bioethical questions emerging from the pandemic, 
such as who should be treated if medical resources are 
limited, and how best to support those who are dying 
in medical isolation. The rush to buy toilet roll now 
seems ridiculous, but at the beginning of the outbreak 
enclosed space of a train carriage or an aircraft, in 
a shared mode of embodied being-with that is now 
unthinkable and will remain so for the foreseeable 
future.
Such fundamental changes to our embodied shared 
space and shared habits can do powerful philosophical 
work. They reveal to us the hitherto unconsidered, 
and hence tacit, aspects of our life. In this particular 
case, they reveal the extent to which being with others 
is premised on the tacit knowledge that we can be 
physically close, that we can share food, a picnic rug, 
play and sports equipment, and that we are free to 
interact with unlimited numbers of people. It also 
reveals the extent to which proximity plays a positive 
role, and indeed underpins, many of our activities.
 
***
A second philosophical insight we can glean from the 
swift recent changes to our lives is that our use of the 
terms “normal” and “pathological” is unstable and 
radically revisable, as social and material conditions 
change. We are now living in ways that would have 
© Megan Diddie
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panic shopping and hoarding of key items put stress on 
our usual assumptions about the availability of basic 
household items. It is now obvious that we will need 
to be much more flexible and adaptive, for example, we 
may need to come in and out of lockdown repeatedly 
due to further waves of infection. One lesson is that we 
need to be able to quickly change habits and ways of 
doing things, and that our conception of what is normal 
and what is not, will be frequently and repeatedly 
updated in the coming months. Conceptual stability 
will not be easily recoverable. 
This is important for philosophy, because of its focus 
on the analysis of concepts. We can no longer assume 
that our concepts are relatively stable and all we need 
to do is clarify them – not an easy task, but at least a 
clear program. What emerges from the now visible 
plasticity of concepts like “normal” and “abnormal” is 
that we need a framework that acknowledges that such 
concepts are shifting and oft-changing, not the eternal, 
perfect forms envisaged by Plato, for example.
***
Finally, I also suggest that the very assumptions about 
normality that have been made visible now also mask 
our vulnerability, dependence on others, finitude, 
and mortality. We operate with tacit expectations of 
normality with regards to health, adverse life events, 
or events such as war and pandemics. These tacit 
expectations include the assumption that we carry 
on being healthy, that our life plans can be carried 
out without significant hindrance, that we will not 
be victims of catastrophic events such as a pandemic. 
These expectations, which are otherwise tacit, become 
apparent in cases of illness or accident. People who 
fall ill often say that ill health was an unwelcome 
surprise, a shock, an intrusion, even though illness 
is a near universal event for most humans at some 
point in their life. This deep rejection, indeed, denial 
of our vulnerable bodies, was the topic of my 2008 
book, Illness: The Cry of the Flesh, which describes my 
experience of being diagnosed, and living with, a rare 
degenerative respiratory condition. We commonly 
refuse to accept our vulnerability to disease and 
affliction, our dependence on others, and our mortality. 
This refusal and denial are reflected in our responses to 
the pandemic: despite the fact that this is not the first 
coronavirus to jump species into humans (previous 
recent examples include SARS and MERS), the entire 
world was caught unprepared.
WE COMMONLY REFUSE TO 
ACCEPT OUR VULNERABILITY 
TO DISEASE AND AFFLICTION, 
OUR DEPENDENCE ON OTHERS, 
AND OUR MORTALITY
This is not a coincidence. There are deep reasons why no 
one budgeted for a pandemic like this, despite warnings 
from virologists and others. We do not like to admit 
that we are vulnerable and dependent on others to the 
extent that we are. That our bodies are fallible and that 
our health is at an increasing risk of failing as we grow 
older. That we are exposed to affliction and suffering 
even if we do our best to avoid them, and that mortality 
is a shared feature of all life. These “facts of life” – our 
vulnerability and dependence – as Ian Kidd and I 
dubbed them in a 2019 paper, beautifully articulated 
by Alistair MacIntyre in his 1999 book Dependent 
Rational Animals, are masked by our reliance on a sense 
of normalcy. 
Instead of wonder that a pandemic did not come earlier, 
we are confused and angry at its arrival, how it has upset 
our plans and caused deep instability and disruption. 
Such unexpected events frustrate our entrenched 
habits and expectations in ways that we find unsettling 
and upsetting. Our consequent disbelief brings to 
awareness emotionally and existentially disquieting 
aspects of our condition, ones that are deeply true 
albeit difficult to articulate and accept. These “facts of 
life” require us to attend to them in order to appreciate 
our embodied state of imperfection, vulnerability and 
the shared fate of mortality that structures human life 
ontologically and epistemically (because humans are 
aware of their mortality). 
Mortality was the topic of my 2006 book, Life and 
Death in Freud and Heidegger, which put forward a view 
of life as delimited and structured by death. Mortality 
isn’t merely the empirical fact that we all die in the 
end, at some point in the distant future. Rather, our 
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mortality is implicated in every living moment, because 
every moment is only lived once and the sum of these 
moments is always finite. So death isn’t a fact we can 
cast aside as Epicurus suggested. He famously wrote in 
his letter to Menoeceus: “So death, the most terrifying 
of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death 
is not with us; but when death comes, then we do 
not exist”. Rather, on my view, and following Freud 
and Heidegger, death is intimately entangled in life, 
structuring and delimiting life with both temporal 
finitude and finitude of possibilities.
So we can see that the idea of normalcy and abnormalcy 
have a direct bearing on how we understand our 
embodied lockdown experience, pervaded by a sense 
of things having gone awry, and feelings of being 
unanchored because a new normal is yet to replace 
the lost one. It makes us painfully aware of “the facts 
of life” and of our limited ability to control events, to 
secure our health, and to live as we wish.
***
I want to offer two additional concepts that will further 
furnish our account. These are global uncertainty and 
relations with others (what Heidegger calls “being 
with” [Mitsein]). Global uncertainty describes the loss 
of trust and sense of certainty about almost everything 
in our lives. From panic shopping to crossing over 
the street when someone walks our way, pandemic 
experience is characterised by suspicion, uncertainty 
and doubt. We distrust the air we breathe, the surfaces 
we touch, we suspect strangers of being infected. We 
distrust the information we read online. Some distrust 
the science – “anti-vaxxers” are a prime example of 
such entrenched (and in itself dogmatic) distrust. The 
pervasive sense of uncertainty makes us doubt and 
question every bite of food we take, every person we 
pass on the street, and every time we wash our hands 
or wipe a surface. Have I done it well enough? The 
remaining doubt can dismantle our daily life, shaping 
it into a new mould of distrust, compulsion and 
profound anxiety.
In a paper from 2014 I described the phenomenon of 
bodily doubt. I characterize bodily doubt as radically 
modifying our normal bodily experience in three ways: 
loss of continuity, loss of transparency, and loss of 
faith in one’s body. This breakdown of trust reveals 
the more usual phenomenon of bodily certainty – the 
sense of ease and trust that underpins our normal 
bodily experiences. Although bodily certainty is not 
rationally justifiable, we are nonetheless unable to 
reject it, and it is part of our brute animal nature. We 
now see that sense of trust and ease being globally 
disrupted in the experience of the locked-down body. 
The same three losses – of continuity, transparency and 
faith in one’s body – can be more globally seen in other 
lockdown experiences. In the same way that bodily 
trust is undermined in the state I call “bodily doubt”, 
our trust in others, in being in public spaces (e.g. public 
transport), and in bringing items into our homes is also 
undermined. The continuity of embodied, shared life has 
been severely disrupted. The transparency of our being 
in the world has been replaced by a sense of difficulty 
and explicitness – we think twice before getting a 
takeaway, studiously distance from others, plan our 
day considering the risk of infection. And finally, our 
faith in the order of the world, trustworthiness of 
politicians, and information we read online has been 
deeply fractured.
WE ARE STRUCTURED AS 
INHERENTLY SOCIAL ENTITIES, 
AND HOW AND IF WE RELATE 
TO OTHERS IS MERELY AN 
EMPIRICAL INFLECTION OF AN 
ONTOLOGICAL FACT ABOUT US 
HUMANS: WE ARE “BEINGS-
WITH” OTHERS
This dismantling of daily life is also accompanied by 
a sense of a change to our temporal experience. The 
Friday afternoon pint that ushers in the weekend, the 
morning rush to make the school run on time, Saturday 
morning shopping – these organise our lives into a 
familiar tempo. Term time and holiday, weekdays and 
weekends, and even the schedule of each day have been 
removed from daily life, resulting in changes to our 
experience of time. Many have commented on social 
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media about how quickly time 
passes and how all the days seem 
the same. Many have noted that 
time feels like an undifferentiated 
flow that becomes disorienting 
and dispiriting. Some are unsure 
what day of the week it is. Global 
uncertainty affects all domains 
of personal experience, including 
temporal, social, existential and 
emotional. It affects our entire way 
of being in the world.
I now turn to the final concept – 
being-with (Mitsein), also coined 
by Heidegger. “Being-with” 
© Megan Diddie
reflects the fundamental sociality 
of human life and the way that 
whether we are with other people 
or in solitary confinement, we are 
always with (or without, which is a 
modulated, or “privative” mode of 
“with”) others. We are structured 
as inherently social entities, and 
how and if we relate to others is 
merely an empirical inflection of an 
ontological fact about us humans: 
we are “beings-with” others. This 
insight allows us to understand the 
scale of disruption and how deep it 
runs: into our very core as beings 
who are always being-with.
This being-with has an obvious 
bodily dimension. It sheds further 
light on the opening paragraph, in 
which I described my son’s disdain 
for online contact: when we are 
with others, we are embodied 
creatures, who meet others in 
and with our bodies. Being with is 
incomplete when it is conducted 
entirely at a distance, mediated, or 
soaked in fear. We can see this in 
the reports of patients struggling 
to communicate with, and be 
cared for by, gowned, masked and 
visored health care staff. We are 
deeply affected by stories not just 
about dying, but dying alone, or 
watching a loved one pass on a 
screen, because health regulations 
allow no visitors into ICU. 
These examples evidence the 
profound ways in which the current 
pandemic is a state of deep, and 
deeply embodied, pathology. How 
we might emerge from it is not just 
a practical question, but a deeply 
philosophical one. We could use 
this pandemic as an opportunity 
to reflect on the “normal” and to 
broaden the narrow band of what 
is considered normal, in order to 
allow for an unanticipated, newly 
formed, and richer array of social 
arrangements, behaviours and 
norms to be included in the “new 
normal”.
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